

Islamic Mission and Call: the case of the International Islamic University, Islamabad

JAMAL MALIK

ABSTRACT *The following paper begins with an outline of the motives for da'wah as presented by the du'āt themselves, followed by a discussion of the significance of mission in Pakistan. The International Islamic University and its da'wah wing is documented in detail, with a focus on its ideological foundations and its objectives. The main part of the paper is devoted to how the Da'wah Academy tries to conduct its programmes among different target groups, especially students, and how it acts at the international level using workshops and various media.*

Motives for Da'wah

Broadly speaking, the aims of *da'wah* are to bring about a new Muslim self-definition, replacing a view that suffered from the colonial or Christian critique that Islam was superstition, to integrate different ethnic and social as well as religious groups under the aegis of a central institution, and to produce the ideological and theological prerequisite for the unity of Muslims and for Islamic brotherhood, the *ummah*. Hence, the incentive for contemporary *da'wah* arose from internationalistic Islamic movements and organizations in the sixties, although similar ambitions can be made out at the end of the last century, when the *Nadwat al-'Ulamā'* in Lucknow fostered the Islamic call in India. The ideals of an *ummah*, however, were soon transformed into nationalistic program-matics and were used to further Islamic statehood.

Thus, the need for Islamic call, *da'wah*, usually emerged in a certain historical context, either when Muslims saw themselves threatened by other religious groups, when they planned to expand their spheres of interest, or when a particular group among them wanted to change the given 'un-Islamic' (*bid'ati*) environment. While the first is true in the case of Christian missionary activities in Muslim societies in general and Indian-Muslim regions in particular, the latter was the case when avant-gardist Muslims started to propagate a reformist Islam, *iṣlāḥ*. The aim was to re-establish the characteristics of the early Islamic era in an environment which was/is very much determined by colonial culture or by local cultures, which were mainly promoted by Sūfis, particularly in the Indian setting

In fact, the contemporary *da'wah*, according to an Islamic activist, results from a feeling of deficiency prevalent among Muslims, a feeling which was, again, the outcome of Western hegemony and the Christian critique of Islamic countries and culture. Hence, the task was to use all possible means for the emancipation of Muslims and formally to get rid of Western dominance.¹ Yet, at the same time, major issues raised by Western critics in the context of Islamic culture were often taken for granted. As a German *dā'ī* puts it, 'the shortcomings which we see in the efforts of Muslims are not due to wrong objectives, but due to the lack of planning, systematic work and continuous evaluation.'²

Thus, *da'wah* as a whole is considered to be the only way to overcome this suggested 'backwardness', reformers considering themselves as its spearheads, while the majority of Muslims and Islamic scholars are regarded as indifferent to the propagation of Islamic teachings, *da'wah*, and the establishment of the *ummah*.³ A broad target group for missionary activities can be discerned, while material support is demanded—often in a moralizing tone—from financially well-to-do Muslim states.⁴

As can be deduced from these few comments, it was not the traditional scholars of Islam, who were primarily engaged in mission. Rather, the architects as well as the main actors of *da'wah* were drawn from a particular narrow social group: generally urban, Western-oriented and 'modern', exposed to colonial culture, the *salafīs*. They saw themselves as representatives of the ideal *ummah* and postulated the basics of Islamic ideology, propagating the right and prohibiting evil (*amr bi al-ma'rūf* etc.), thereby making Muslims the best of mankind, or *mu'minūn*, equivalent to *du'āt*.⁵

In Pakistan, *da'wah* has taken a particular shape, since the state was created for Muslims and, according to the latest policy, was to be turned into an 'Islamic' state. The country being inhabited by representatives of a variety of Muslim discourses who themselves reflect particular social and economic backgrounds and religious affiliations, the main aim of *da'wah* here was to integrate this diversity of cultural articulations in order to bring about a common Islamic ideology.

Support of Islamic sciences and culture became major aspects of this policy, though of a particular modernist brand. Dissemination of emissaries and the use of the existing religious infrastructure, the mosques and *madāris*, were the main vehicles, for mosques are regarded as the nucleus of *da'wah* and are also the organizational expression of it at the micro-level, making education possible on the primary level. In order to co-ordinate such complex activities and bring together the different world views, a new central institution was essential for developing international as well as national tools. Modern schooling and knowledge of foreign languages and different schools of thought were its prerequisites. This was, however, only possible through a deep knowledge of Sharī'a. Hence the Institute for Sharī'a and the Legal Profession was set up in 1978 at the Qaid-e Azam University (QAU) in Islamabad. The primary task of the Institute was to train men in short term courses in Islamic criminal law, *hudūd*, and principles of different schools of law in order to produce skills for Islamization.⁶

The International University, Islamabad

The requirement for such missionary work among the 'backward masses' was, however, a central umbrella institution which would co-ordinate activities and produce scholars and *du'āt* to carry the message of state-Islam throughout the country and abroad. The Islamic University (IU) established in 1980,⁷ was, in contrast to former institutions, centrally located, that is in the capital, Islamabad, the abode of Islam, and addressed the youth. The location was symbolically significant, suggesting affiliation with the government and Muslim countries in the cause of Islam. Moreover, since the Pakistani state had developed an understanding of itself as the citadel of Islam, the centre considered itself to be legitimized to transmit its perception of religion to Muslims as well as non-Muslims, not only within its own boundaries but also in Southeast Asia, in Muslim minority regions and in the diaspora.⁸ It was from here that a new policy of *da'wah* emerged.

The IU was established in contrast to the National Education Policy 1979, which prescribed that, for the purpose of improving existing universities, no new ones should

be set up. The University, however, was essentially nothing new; it brought together several institutes which hitherto had been part of other universities or institutions, e.g. the Institute of Sharī'a, which had been part of the QAU, the Islamic Research Institute, which had existed since 1960, and the Institute of Languages, etc. In the beginning, the University functioned as a custodian of the great Faisal Mosque, and it was later integrated into its cultural complex. Again, it was not a creation of the 'ulamā' but of Pakistani bureaucrats, technocrats and intellectuals with the financial and personal support of Saudi Arabia. Thus, relations with political and financial patrons were deep and are reflected in the personnel of the institution, teachers and students.

In order to execute the task of *da'wah* in particular, it was important to found an organization with a religious and ideological component and a community orientation. Such an Islamic organization had to be self-sufficient, and this required manpower, finances and training.⁹ Therefore, a *da'wah* Academy was established.

The Da'wah Academy

Because existing institutions could not meet the demand felt for a projected Islamized state, the IU, with a special Presidential grant of Rs 2 million, established an Institute of Da'wat and Qirat in 1982,¹⁰ the first chairman of which was an American PhD, Dr Anis Ahmad, brother of Prof. Khurshid Ahmad, a high functionary of the Jamā'at-e Islāmī.¹¹

The Institute soon became one of the leading active branches of the IU,¹² offering MA and BA courses in missionary work. The prerequisite for joining it was the holding of a BA or LB certificate, or a degree in Islamic law,¹³ while graduates from religious schools were not addressed at the beginning. At this stage, activities were strictly confined to the national level: in co-operation with the Federal Ministry of Education, the Institute had to develop a course in Qur'ān reading starting from class six, in order to make the Qur'ān comprehensible to a wider population with the aid of relevant translated Ḥadīths. Only gradually did the Institute begin to take up the task of trans-national mission to facilitate co-operation among different Muslim regions. Hence, financial transfers through scholarships, training programmes and exchange of literature and information became important aspects,¹⁴ while a constituency was sought among youth.

In 1985, when the IU was upgraded into an International Islamic University¹⁵ (IIU), the Institute became an autonomous body, called the Academy of Da'wah and Training of Imāms, by means of a Presidential Directive. The administrative structure of the Academy was provided basically by the IU. Its Council included twelve high level officials and scholars.¹⁶ Again, support of religious scholars was not asked for. The Academy now had to formulate a programme and supervise and co-ordinate the activities in the field of mission. With the internationality of the University, the Academy started to engage itself more intensely in trans-national missionary activities.¹⁷

A comprehensive five-year 'Action Plan for implementation of Da'wah Project, Inside and Outside Pakistan, 1983–88'¹⁸ briefly discusses the prerequisites of *da'wah*, e.g., core workers, the tools of mission and its internationalization through the media. Instead of a radical change of given structures, the plan stated that those countries committed to Islamization 'have the obligation to utilize their existing administrative machinery for the propagation of Islam'. Accordingly, it was thought necessary to address members of Foreign Services and other officers in Government departments with a view to bringing about 'a modification in existing cultural affairs offices in foreign

missions' through re-orientation programmes.¹⁹ The ideal image for *da'wah* was, according to these *salafī* perceptions, to be sought in Muhammadan times—the Medina model, the mosque, the nucleus of the *ummah*—while the Islamic message could be disseminated abroad only after a phase of consolidation and integration of different social groups: 'At no point in history was *da'wah* associated with a class, tribe, nation, or linguistic entity', and it thereby transgressed social and religious boundaries, though peacefully. For this, well-educated *du'āt* were needed who would have excellent capabilities and above all knowledge of modern technologies and management.²⁰

With regard to the media, publications on different levels were to be prepared for an intellectual audience, a media centre proposed, and a special channel for Islamic items established. Reference was also made to Christian activities in this field.

This extensive action plan, however, was not realized *in toto*, especially in the field of foreign services. What remained from the action plan was (1) the production of *da'wah* literature on different levels, (2) periodic *tarbiya* programmes for Muslim community leaders, (3) orientation courses for different opinion-makers, and (4) an audio-visual section.²¹

In order to facilitate programme activities above all at the national level and particularly for *a'immah*, contacts with *madāris* were established, especially with regard to the syllabus which was to be developed by the Academy. This, however, led to massive reservations among religious scholars, though financial incentives were offered to a *a'immah* to participate in the courses.²²

Of central importance was the definition of a *dā'ī* and his abilities: large-heartedness and forbearance, deliberation and wisdom as well as the ability to engage in dialogue, moral uprightness, self-criticism, sensibility and the quality of being conversant. It was thought to be crucial to appeal to the emotions of the target groups rather than to stress logical and intellectual faculties.²³ In short, a *dā'ī* was to be the living ideal for the people,²⁴ a super-Muslim, so to speak. In encountering other ideological tendencies, he always had to refer to the concept of *ummah*. In this respect, one can imagine competing senses of identity among the *du'āt* during the courses at the Academy.

Closely connected with the qualities of a *dā'ī* are the techniques used in proselytizing, although in none of the several publications of the Academy are techniques *per se* discussed to establish a theoretical framework for how, practically, to go about being a *dā'ī*. The most important aspect of the technique, however, was considered to be the dialogue, knowing the predicaments and problems of the people addressed, and establishing personal contact with them.²⁵ *Jihād* in this context was not merely defined in an exoteric sense but also esoterically,²⁶ but a *dā'ī* should still hold to his distinction as a Muslim. Thus, Islamic *adab* was to be maintained.

Da'wah understood as a trans-local and trans-regional matter, with the aim of making Muslims better Muslims and of establishing the *ummah*, could also be used as a liberation theology among the wretched in Africa and America.²⁷

***Da'wah* among Different Target Groups and its Dissemination**

As suggested by the 'Action Plan', the programme of *da'wah* was to be developed among different social strata and in different regions. At the national level the Academy introduced several programmes for particular target groups that were somehow affiliated with the nationalized Islamic infrastructure, like the *a'immah*, *khuṭabah*, etc. of the Awqāf Department. Since they are regarded as actors of *amr bi al-ma'rūf* etc. they have considerable influence in the realm of law and order. In this way too, public work

in mosques, and their control, can be guaranteed and the official ideology can be disseminated at the micro-level.

Most of the programmes conducted by the Academy lasted for three months and dealt with *a'immah* and with mosques as centres for *da'wah* activities. These courses were first proposed by the '*bahali-e 'azmat-e raftah kamiti*', which was set up along with others at the Nifaz-e Islam Convention in 1985 under the aegis of the Ministry of Religious Affairs.²⁸ The committee comprised more than 70 members—mostly traditional and loyal Islamic scholars—and suggested above all the rehabilitation and upgrading of mosques and of graduates of religious schools: all semi-literate or illiterate (*kam ya ghair ta'limyafah a'immah* of the central mosques (*markazi masjid*: apparently mosques which were run by the Awqaf Department) were to go through a two-year educational programme in Islamic studies,²⁹ whereas all *a'immah* of non-central mosques were to participate in a six-month course. The committee further suggested that the participants thus selected should be given stipends by the government.

***A'immah* Courses**

The Academy, however, did not follow these proposals totally but instead divided its courses into two categories at the national level: educational and correspondence courses. The objectives of the first were that *a'immah* should know how to recite the Qur'an and the biography of the Prophet, have knowledge about the duties of *imāmat*, try to converse in Arabic, be informed about contemporary affairs and problems, and play a role in the nation-building process.³⁰ This policy implied, of course, that *a'immah* had little knowledge about what was perceived to be Islam by the Academy. Moreover, the new institution-building process attempted implicitly to supervise or to abolish autochthonous structures, such as *dīnī madāris* run by various independent umbrella organizations. This process of integration was accelerated by using 'modes of Islamic finance' such as *zakāt* and *waqf*.³¹

Since the Academy considered itself to be the only trans-regional organization for *da'wah* not limited by particular schools of thought or regional considerations, representatives of the three main Sunnī *makātib-e fikr* (Deobandī, Bareilwī, Ahl-e Ḥadīth) were present in the courses, while the Shī'a were excluded from the beginning. The *a'immah* courses were addressed to men mostly under 40 years of age. While the average time previously spent in education by the participants in this first course is said to be 4–6 years, for the second *a'immah* course only graduates from religious schools were selected. For the third course, there were plans to call upon *a'immah* with primary education only. Literature offered was mostly written by well-known reformists such as Sayyid Quṭb, Mawdūdī, Islāhī, Shiblī, Nadawī, etc. Major time was spent on dramatizations of situations (plays), followed by missionary journeys, leisure time for continuing one's studies, educational competitions, and finally workshops. Teachers for the courses were recruited from the ranks of moderate '*ulamā*' and university professors. There were apparently far more applicants for *a'immah* courses than the Academy could actually absorb, since it lacked the necessary funds. For example, more than 100 people applied for the third *a'immah* course, but only 28 were selected. It was also thought that three months was too short for comprehensive training. Consequently, the time was extended to 18 weeks.³² The growing interest in participation—the reason for which may have been the prospect of stipends—might have necessitated the longer duration and a more elaborate programme.

Approximately 40 participants per *a'immah* course were envisaged and up to 1989, 368 men had gone through eleven courses.³³ Apparently, the Academy's activities became popular, and after the seventh course, the Pakistan Army showed keen interest in the programmes and its members were integrated into the eighth course. The Awqāf Department also sent members, starting with the tenth course. In this way, lower and middle ranks of government officials and the army were also gradually included in *da'wah* activities.³⁴

As a closer look at the participants of the first five *a'immah* courses shows, the majority of participants were urban, while the Deobandi school of thought was clearly over-represented. The average educational standard of these courses was quite high since participants were usually degree holders from an umbrella organization of religious schools, mostly the Deobandi *wafaq al-madāris al-'arabiya*. Some even held an MA in Islamic Studies or in Arabic. Urban participation in the courses has increased, especially from the ninth course onwards, as a result of the participation of the Pakistan Army and of the Awqāf Department.³⁵

So far, the Academy's activities had only been partly aimed at the lower strata. In order to enhance its progress in this field, it started offering free food and accommodation for the trainees, as well as scholarships, always keeping in mind the goal of bringing together different schools of thought in one formal setting. In this way, the organizers not only wanted to eradicate existing religious differences: 'If the course continues it is hoped that this will eventually be able to minimize the religious differences among *'ulamā'* in Pakistan and at the same time create a better image of Pakistan abroad'.³⁶

Correspondence Courses

Another type of *da'wah* was the so-called 'Islamic Correspondence Course' introduced in October 1985 in an advertisement inviting people to register. The courses were based on *khuṭbas* delivered in the mosque of the IU. The sermons plus questions were mailed to registered students. After having answered questions on more than 50 Friday sermons correctly, the students received a *sanad*.³⁷ Most of the correspondence 'students' were government employees, students and pensioners as well as housewives and scholars. In 1986 the Academy also started a correspondence course for the Army, most of the participants belonging to the middle and lower ranks and technical professions. Also, the Pakistan Army selected 50 unit *khuṭabā'* on an experimental basis and asked the Academy for issuance of *khuṭbas*.³⁸ From 1989 onwards, the Academy expanded the Correspondence Courses by introducing new courses on Ḥadīth, religious knowledge, Islamic Law and Islam for overseas students as well, with the result that by the end of 1991 nearly 12,000 students had already passed this course.³⁹

Thus, the Academy has been trying to appeal to different strata through different modes of communication and programmes, the *a'immah*, the students, and the military being of particular interest. In this way the lower as well as middle level of society is being addressed. State ideology combined with Islamic internationalistic ideology is being disseminated, not only through traditional institutions of Islamic discourse, the mosque, *waqf* and *madāris*, but also through modern institutions such as the army and formal education. A Children's Literature Project, launched in 1990, which publishes religious and moral literature for pupils from classes one to ten,⁴⁰ and a first Scouts Leaders programme open to Pakistani nationals only in May 1992, support this approach. In order to gain momentum in the trans-national field, the Academy has

been conducting other programmes as well, while the Ministry of Religious Affairs has made arrangements for other programmes in co-operation with al-Azhar.⁴¹

Da'wah Directed towards non-Muslims: da'wah abroad

In the trans-national field, the Academy offers so-called 'International Islamic Tarbiyat Programmes' or 'International Leadership Training Programmes' on the role of leadership in the application of *da'wah*. The courses usually last one month and are held in the cultural complex of the IU. The objective postulated is to improve the organization of Islamic activities and make them more substantial in a 'systematic and scientific way'. Muslim countries must have properly trained persons, it is said, 'to develop educational and training programmes, which are important in rediscovering Islamic identity. Pakistan, being the citadel of Islam and candle of hope for the Muslims of the world is expected, greatly, to cater for the needs of Muslim communities in the field of education and training.' The aim is to 'create awareness of Islamic identity in Muslims living in non-Muslim surroundings and to develop an ideological consciousness' which ultimately should lead to Muslim unity. In the summer of 1984, therefore, a course called International Tarbiyah Camp was held in Islamabad, the first and only one of its kind in South Asia, and by the end of 1992, nearly 300 community leaders from 50 countries had been trained in eight courses under this scheme.⁴²

'The International Tarbiyah Camp is one response of the Government of Pakistan to the demands of Muslim minorities,' says the organ of the Da'wah Academy.⁴³ Youth is the main target group of these camps since it is considered to be creative, active and mobile and having huge potential. The courses are, however, very much addressed to the upper tiers of society, or what has been called the intermediary sectors, students of the formal education system.⁴⁴ Hence, when in Pakistan, participants are invited by the highest official levels and addressed by eminent Pakistani technocrats and internationally reputed scholars affiliated with the Rabitat or the Mu'tamar. In this way, a common feeling of *ummah* is created, affiliating the participants with the 'ideological state' of Pakistan as well as with International Muslim Organizations which would represent the Islamic brotherhood.⁴⁵

Usually, participants are drawn from Southeast Asia (about 70%) and Africa, with a few also from Europe and Australia. They are between 20 and 30 years of age and have all been in some way or other active in a Muslim organization in their home countries, mostly of an urban character and connected with the international communication system. The prospective *du'at* should be well-versed in current affairs as well as acquainted with the psyche and problems of the addressees, which may involve a certain intellectualism acquired at colleges and universities.

In order to gather as much information as possible on the contemporary situation of Muslims, the courses are to be held in a less theoretical manner; stress is laid on problem-oriented aspects, especially in non-Muslim countries, while the time for different course activities is allocated strictly.⁴⁶ The courses are divided into lectures delivered by eminent scholars and technocrats—so-called 'brothers'—and into workshops carried out by participants themselves. While the lectures during the first courses dealt with prominent Muslim leaders and movements, they later covered such basic issues as an introduction to Qur'an and traditional sciences, *da'wah* techniques, Islamic law, Islamic economics, and problems pertaining to contemporary Muslim societies as well as the ideological foundations of Islam. The workshops cover practical aspects of how to run *da'wah* activities and establish *da'wah* centres and organizations, and they

deal with moral education and the characteristics of the Prophet.⁴⁷ In order to organize and systematize workshops, *usrahs* (family, group) comprised of five to eight persons from different countries, are formed, named after *Sahābah* or *Tābi'ūn*, and headed by an *Amīr* or a *Naqīb*, who must excel other participants in *īmān*, *taqwah* and wisdom; his orders should be followed strictly. The basic aim of these groups is to introduce each member (*ta'āruf*), to exchange ideas (*naṣīḥah*) and to support one another (*takalluf*).⁴⁸ The language of communication is primarily English, followed by Arabic if possible. In this way a solidarity is developed by creating a ritual connection between participants and early Muhammadan times: they are given a *salaḥī* identity. Regional, ethnic and social boundaries are transcended and the participants drawn into common religious and social action led by an *Amīr*, who should have semi-prophetic qualities.

Although the curricula of the workshops differ from course to course and from target group to target group, they have some basic features in common, such as the study of Hadīth, theology, qur'ānic sciences, Islamic law, history and languages.⁴⁹ Also, social welfare services are main targets of the courses. During field-work, participants have to ask about the Islamization process in Pakistan and have to perform practical *da'wah*. The impressions thus gathered are finally written down in a report.⁵⁰ This task was considered possible because in the course of time, the Academy postulated that it was the only legitimate forum for such a multi-faceted undertaking, since traditional fora did not have 'properly trained persons to handle the work', especially for Muslim minorities. Thus, the new techniques and methods were to be tried out in the camps and applied in localities nearby.⁵¹

Courses are also offered to new Muslims of different countries to make them conversant in Islamic teachings and to develop a sense of Muslim unity.⁵² At the request of the Regional Da'wah Council Malaysia, training programmes of former Christian priests were elaborated with the help of the RAI (so-called instruction for new Muslims) as well, and by May 1992, three such courses had been conducted with more than 60 participants.⁵³

In this context, the *Dakwah* missionary movement in Malaysia,—a multiplicity of organizations, particularly fervent in certain urban contexts (student and middle-class), which were put under tight government control in 1979 and led by the first Secretary-General of the Islamic Conference⁵⁴—is of particular interest. Under the pressure of Islamizing forces, an Islamic University was established with missionary zeal, since in Malaysia Islam is not merely a religion but 'also, perhaps above all, the mark of a cultural identity, endorsed by a glorious collective past, fuelled by an entire mythology and capable of serving as a spearhead in confrontations with those populations which have remained animist, and more especially with Christians and Westerners.'⁵⁵ Consequently, in January 1980 the Asian-Pacific Regional Conference on Da'wah was held in Kuala Lumpur, supported by the Arab oil-exporting countries. It was established that *da'wah* among non-Muslims of this region should be furthered since Islam would hasten the process of integrating different ethnic groups.⁵⁶ The comparatively young population of Malaysia—43% under 15 and 53% between 15 and 64 years of age—was thought to have the necessary dynamic potential for this cause. Beyond ideological considerations, it was a pragmatic decision because in Malaysia the judiciary is centrally organized while Muslim religious (*qazi*) courts are under the state's administration with civil jurisdiction over Muslims only.⁵⁷ This implies that there is a considerable need for Islamically educated personnel, similar to Islamized Pakistan, where *qazi* courts were planned as well.

The Role of the Media

All these training activities are accompanied by publications in Urdu, vernacular languages such as Pashtu and Sindhi, as well as in English. Thus, wide regions could be integrated into a common communication system subject to the control of the government. For example, for the propagation of *da'wah* in Pakistan, several booklets were published by the Academy, all reflecting a considerable degree of moral instruction, as in booklets for Muslim Pakistani students.⁵⁸

In a booklet addressed to the 'ordinary man'—particularly the urban middle class—the concept of *īmān* (faith) and its practical aspects are explained.⁵⁹ Since man is considered *khalīfa* of God on earth, he has to have *īmān* in Him. Faith, however, must be cultivated through *'amal* (practice or action), which in former times comprised more than mere practice of rituals. It was *'ibadat*, it is postulated, which in time was truncated from politics, although Islam is a religion (*dīn*) and therefore encompasses all aspects of life, as Ibn Taymiyya said. *īmān* also implies love for God and His Prophet and absolute obedience to Him, which is not possible for anyone engaged in usury or involved in committing *zinā* or corruption, as Mawdūdī said. Other aspects of faith are patience and *jihād*, even the militant version of it. Thus, the 'ordinary man' is enlightened through statements by well-known reformers.

A booklet specifically addressed to *du'āt* gives additional insight into the mind of one modernist Islamic scholar.⁶⁰ In contrast to other contributors to the Academy's publications, the author points to the political character of *da'wah*. He distinguishes between the efforts and endeavours of prophets (*anbiyā'*) on the one hand, and those of politicians (*ahl-e siyāsat*) on the other. The first live the ideal they proclaim; their actions are social and bring about societal change first, then gradually flow into political change. They represent truth (*ḥaqq*), and their mission (*tabligh*) and efforts (*shahādat*) are therefore based in religion (*dīn*). They also want to please God and aim at levelling or smoothing the way for the Hereafter (*ākhirat ki kanyabi ka husul*), but are also rewarded in this life (*ghalbah awr tafawwuq ḥaṣil hona*). They never aim at establishing a divine government (*ḥukūmat-e illāhī*) or at becoming political leaders. In contrast, politicians are motivated by the selfish aim of establishing their rule. If they do this in accordance with the constitution (e.g. through elections) as based in the British system, their prime consideration is the number of voters and they do their utmost to win them over. If they pursue their selfish interests illegally, their actions are based in intrigue (*sazish*) and their interest is guided by the desire for power (*iqūdār*); they pretend to act in accordance with a divine system.

Interestingly, this contribution explicitly differentiates between religion and politics and does not approve of *du'āt* acting politically when encountering Western influence and when eliminating *fitna*. It also implicitly criticizes *coups d'état* and the propagation of an Islamic system from above.

All these national publications suggest that no clear ideological approach towards *da'wah* can be discerned in the publications of the Academy.⁶¹ They seem to represent a multitude of perspectives and share a common approach only with respect to a universalizing Islam, the attempt to control autonomous institutions, and in making basic teachings of Islam available to a broad base.

Of particular interest is the English monthly *Da'wah Highlights*, the trans-national organ of the Academy. The primary task of this monthly is to 'develop and improve *ummah* identity consciousness of modern Muslims.'⁶² Its public are Westernized Muslims and non-Muslims. Here one can find different statements by Muslim intellec-

tuals. A brief look into this periodical again reveals the holistic and also pluralistic approach of the Academy, which sometimes contradicts the official policy of Islamization, as in the contribution of Işlahî above. In another example, the notion of *jāhiliyah* as understood by Sayyid Quṭb is quoted: ‘Jahiliyah is the worship of some people by others; that is to say, some people become dominant and make laws for others. Regardless of whether these laws are against God’s injunctions and without caring for the use or misuse of this authority ... Islam cannot accept any mixing with Jahiliyah.’⁶³ This statement is of course not only thought-provoking in the context of Pakistan where the political system has been feeble, unstable and mostly dominated by the authoritarian exercise of power. The statement is also isolationist and is in no way compatible with policies which tend to legitimize given structures through Islamic nomenclature.

Da’wah Highlights, Vol. 3, Jan. 1989, attempts to elevate the Muslim world *vis-à-vis* the West with regard to morals by stating that mental disorder is mostly found in scientifically and technologically progressive and developed societies. The reason for this malady is to be sought in a lack of faith that results from the failure to link this life and the Hereafter, a prevalent trend in Western philosophy. Muslims are obliged to bridge this gap by communicating Islamic solutions to the Western mind through the practice of Islamic ideology.⁶⁴ Again, no clear answer is given to the question of what Islamic ideology is and how it should be practised.⁶⁵

Ismail Faruqi, a well-known Islamic modernist, is quoted on the teachings of *da’wah*, stressing the centrality of rational belief. According to him, Islam is an intellectual, historical, tolerant and universal religion, a universal brotherhood, a *din-e fitrat*, not a mystical but a social order and it is identity-giving. It is, at the same time, critical but without existential anxiety. Accordingly, a Muslim never loses his mental balance: ‘In fact, mental illness is very rare in the Muslim country’, he states. While elaborating his argument, he also implicitly points to environmental problems.⁶⁶ In this way Faruqi is able to appeal to groups concerned with contemporary problems, but he also accepts Western critique and polemics and in an apologetic manner propagates Islam as a rational system—as if Islam were *per se* irrational!

Besides these publications, the Academy has issued a voluminous directory of Islamic organizations active all over the world and also conducts area studies, survey reports and fact-finding visits in different regions in order to establish a network or an Islamic infrastructure.⁶⁷ Also, the establishment of a media centre is envisaged since modern tools are considered important to communicating Islamic *da’wah* worldwide. Besides audio-visual material, the ‘Academy plans to establish a small radio station to air the message of Islam to other nations in their own languages.’⁶⁸ Technical support for this is sought mainly in Japan.

Conclusion

Islamization policy thus makes special use of *da’wah* as a tool for universalizing different Islamic identities and integrating them into common political action, especially through the mobilization of *a’immah*, students and the middle rank officials in administration, jurisprudence, the police and the military. For this purpose, different publics are addressed through the media and traditional as well as modern techniques are used, while autochthonous institutions are integrated into the state system. Thus, hitherto untouched areas are subject to *salafī* mission, which can be exported easily. Rituals performed during the courses and meetings offered by the Da’wah Academy become a source of identity, thereby bringing about a common feeling among the *du’āt* them-

selves and the representatives of higher official levels. Reference is made to a transnational Islamic character, which develops a sense of brotherhood among Muslims in general and Muslims in Muslim minority areas in particular, the object being to set up a creative and humanitarian society. Such 'ummahization' through macrocosmic concepts is fostered by affiliations with other Islamic organizations and states, and it facilitates the integration of participants, irrespective of their regional and ethnic differences. In particular, participants looking for an institutional affiliation in a new urban environment may find an alternative source of satisfaction in this organized life in association, which provides security and fraternal certitude. With regard to the growing number of students in the IU and of participants in the Academy—particularly as a result of the army's support with regard to the job market—one may consider these activities to be the right supply for a demand prevalent among certain social urban groups, particularly the lower and middle classes, which have become more and more the victims of a mismatch. The growing demand for such *da'wah* courses is also reflected in the fact that even during the interlude of the Pakistan People's Party under Benazir Bhutto, the budget of the Academy was increased considerably. While it amounted to 3.2 million Rs in 1985–86⁶⁹ and 8.05 million Rs in 1987–88, it increased to 21.4 million Rs in the year 1988–89.⁷⁰ This not only shows the impact of the Islamization policy lobby in Government agencies, but also sheds light on the massive impact of the Academy and its activities in Pakistan as well as abroad.

NOTES

1. See Muhammad Sami' Ullah: *Meaning and Significance of Dawah Ila-Allah*, Islamabad 1985(2), 2. This publication was financed by the Islamic Solidarity Fund, Jeddah. In contrast to the repulsive approach pursued by Sami' Ullah, other avant gardists attempt to re-adjust both Islam and Christianity: 'There is no inherent conflict in their moral, ethical, and value frameworks, and they have a lot to gain by discarding their mutual fears, suspicions and historical hangovers' (*Da'wah Highlights*, Jan. 1991, 14).
2. Ahmad v. Denffer in *Da'wah Highlights*, Vol. 4, Feb. 1989, 4.
3. 'The Ulama ... are also lacking in enthusiasm and are doing practically nothing about the matter' (Muhammad Sami' Ullah, *Meaning*, 2). Thus, *da'wah* has to be propagated among those who love Islam and follow the rituals but who are influenced by wrong values, among the ruling élite and Western-educated youth who are indifferent to Islam, and among the masses who have drifted away from true Islamic teachings due to ignorance (see Muhammad Sami Ullah, *Meaning*, 10–14).
4. 'The leaders (of these countries; J.M.) should realize that oil boom is a gift from Allah and must be used in His Path, otherwise He may withdraw His bounty' (Muhammad Sami' Ullah, *Meaning*, 3).
5. See Sayyid Sulaiman Nadawi, *Islam ka Nizam-e da'wat o tabligh*, (1) *Bara-e Karkunan-e da'wat o tabligh*, Islamabad 1989 (repr.), 8; also Muhammad Sami' Ullah, *Meaning*, 16f.
6. See *Report of the Islamic University (IU) for the year 1982/83*, 42 ff. Later, part of the IU, the Institute of Shari'a, focused more on public prosecutors than on jurists. This suggests that the administration became mainly interested in 'Islamizing' the lower ranks on the social ladder, thereby allowing for better control of socially marginalized, e.g. criminal groups. By Dec. 1988, 750 judges, public prosecutors and members of the Police Executive Services had already been educated in 19 Shari'a courses by the Shari'a Academy at the IU; the majority of them were recruited from the politically restless province of Sindh (see *Report of the IU for the year 1982/83*, 40f; *Da'wah Highlights*, Vol. 3, Jan. 1989, 13).
7. The idea of founding an IU in Pakistan, however, was not new. Already under Ayyub Khan, the Awqaf Department set up in 1960 was eager to establish Bahawalpur University, which turned out to be a failure due to reservations of traditional leaders of Islam, 'ulamā' and *mashaikhs*, whose opinions had not been sought. Under Z.A. Bhutto, the task of Bahawalpur University seems to have been taken over by the Ulama Academy in Lahore, which again was run by the Awqaf

- Department (see Jamal Malik: Waqf in Pakistan: change in traditional institutions, *Die Welt des Islam*, Vol. 30/1990, especially pp. 84f).
8. After all, the 'creation of Pakistan was the Will of Allah' (see *Da'wah Highlights*, March 1991, 5-20). At present, the Da'wah Academy also has plans to invite a group of *a'immah* from Central Asia for training (see *Third International Da'wah Course for New Muslims*, Dec. 1991 March 1992, Islamabad 1992, 32f).
 9. See *Second International Islamic Tarbiyah Program*, pp. 54-56.
 10. Interestingly, in the beginning all but one member of the Institute were graduates or post-graduates of the formal system of education. While some had graduated from Cairo, Riyadh and the University of Punjab, the majority of them were educated in the USA and the UK. Moreover, the Institute worked in close co-operation with the Foreign Services Institute (see *The Islamic University Calendar 1985*, Vol. 1, Islamabad 1985, 134 and *Islamic University Islamabad; Vice Chancellor's Annual Report 1982-83*, Islamabad 1984, 34, 38).
 11. There is no doubt that Zia al-Haqq's Islamization policy was very much supported by the Jamā'at-e Islāmī, for which he gave them a reasonable share in the policy-making process, particularly in the field of education.
 12. In fact, one-third of the 180-page *Annual Report 1989/90 Session, HU* (mimeo 1991), documents the activities of the Da'wah Academy followed by the Sharī'a Academy, while the International Institute of Islamic Economics is portrayed on only 28 pages etc. Other activities such as teaching are neglected in this report.
 13. The courses offered lasted three to four years (see *The Islamic University Handbook 1985-86*, Islamabad 1985, 9, 29f).
 14. E.g. bibliographies were compiled and Islamic writings from Arabic and Urdu translated into European languages (see *Report of the IU for the year 1982/83*, 35f).
 15. The attribute 'international' does not refer to any international standard of education. It only implies the transnational composition of the students and teachers, who more or less constitute the middle classes and who had had in some way or other affiliations with the Jamā'at-e Islāmī or similar religious-political parties before joining the University.
 16. E.g. the Chairman who was to be appointed by the Board of Governors, the Chairman of the Council of Islamic Ideology (CII), the Chairman of the University Grants Commission (UGC) or a member of UGC, the chief Justice of the Federal Shariat Court or a judge, the Secretary of the Ministry of Religious Affairs or the nominee, but not below Joint Secretary, the Secretary of the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting or nominee, but not below Joint Secretary, a nominee of the Board of Trustees, a nominee of the Board of Governors, two eminent scholars to be nominated by the President, the Vice-President to be nominated by the President, and the Director General of the Academy (see *Progress Report*, 8-11).
 17. See *Progress Report: The Academy for Da'wah & Training of Imāms (The Da'wah Project)* (mimeo), 8.
 18. For the following, compare Anis Ahmed, *International Da'wah Project (An Action-Plan for implementation of Da'wah Project, inside and outside Pakistan, 1983-88)* (revised and updated) Islamabad, 1986 (mimeo).
 19. In doing so, the trainees could also work in foreign services. e.g. as Religious Attachés. Effective *da'wah*, it was argued, required an intensive academic study of Islam and of other world religions and ideologies, as well as of communication and social psychology.
 20. The courses thus offered were (1) a 16 week refresher course for *a'immah* in aspects of Islamic rituals, for information about world systems, religions and ideologies, and for knowledge of Arabic and English; (2) a 16-week orientation programme in Islamic learning for those engaged in the media; and (3) a 16 or 32-week refresher course for teachers of Islamic Studies/Islamic History in colleges and universities. All addressees were to be taught the Islamic way of life and principles as well as aspects of contemporary affairs. A fourth programme was to deal with leaders of Islamic communities in Muslim minority regions outside Pakistan. In this 16-week leadership training programme, the main task was to provide information about the management and techniques of *da'wah* abroad. In order to make the programme successful, financial and social incentives were proposed: one increment or a licence in *da'wah* would be granted to Pakistani teachers who passed an orientation/refresher course. For passing a leadership programme, two increments were suggested. Media producers and journalists would be granted one increment on the relevant scale while *a'immah* would receive, after completion of the course, an increment of at least 75 Rs. monthly. Moreover, graduates of the programme who had joined a BA or MA course at the Islamic University were preferred when seeking jobs.

21. See *Fifth International Islamic Tarbiyah Camp: Report*, p. 8f; *Progress Report*, 9f.
22. In this context a consultation on *da'wah* was held in Islamabad in April/May 1983 with five overseas Muslims and three representatives from Pakistani Universities proposing a training programme for Summer 1984. For the purpose of guidance and advice from '*ulamā'*, a consultation meeting was held in October 1984, with five members from the administration, ten moderate '*ulamā'* (mostly Deobandis, one Ahl-e Hadith, two Barelwis, no Shī'a), five judges and twelve professors (see *Progress Report*, 11-19).
23. Thus, traditional scholasticism was given up for the sake of a more pragmatic and probably demagogic approach.
24. See Muhammad Sami' Ullah: *Meaning*, 17-28; *Second International Islamic Tarbiyah Program*, 47. Sayyid Sulaiman Nadawī, *Islam ka Nizam-e da'wat o tabligh*, 13ff, opines that to follow the ideals of the prophets, such as altruism, mercy, considerateness and the ability to leave one's own country for mission, was most important. This again, would imply that the *dā'ī* had to be financially and socially independent and unmarried, i.e. young. Also, presumably Western critique was implicitly accepted by the reformers when stating that 'there is a saying that "Muslims don't know when to stop", so, you have to think before where to stop'. The *dā'ī* had to be informed about this 'Muslim' malaise (see *Second International Islamic Tarbiyah Program*, 48-50).
25. At the same time, he himself should approach people, e.g. in 'corner meetings' because they involve no obligations for the addressees (see *Second International Islamic Tarbiyah Program*, 48f).
26. See Muhammad Sami' Ullah: *Meaning*, 36, 80f.
27. Converting Muslims into rightly guided Muslims is considered more important than converting non-Muslims (see Sayyid Sulaiman Nadawī, *Islam ka Nizam-e da'wat o tabligh*, 21; see also Muhammad Sami' Ullah: *Meaning*, 55, 62, 94-108).
28. See *Report of the Nifaz-e Islam Kanvanshan*, January 1985, Islamabad 1985, 40-46, 137ff.
29. A similar programme had been launched by the Ulama Academy in Lahore in the seventies (see Jamal Malik: *Waqf in Pakistan*, especially 86ff).
30. See *Tarbiyati Mansubah bara-e A'immah-e masaiid*, Islamabad 1986, 1-3.
31. For the discussion of these institutions in the Islamization process, see Jamal Malik; *Islamisierung in Pakistan 1977-1984: Untersuchungen zur Auflösung autochthoner Strukturen*, Wiesbaden, Franz Steiner, 1989.
32. Most of the *a'immah* in the first course originated from Punjab, followed by NWFP, Sindh and finally Kashmir (see, e.g. *Pehla Tarbiyati kurs bara-e A'immah-e masaiid*, Feb.-May 1986, Islamabad n.d., 2f, 13). Like many other reports, this also starts without a *basmala* (see also *Tisrah Tarbiyati kurs bara-e A'immah* Nov 1986-April 1987, Islamabad, n.d., 2-5; *Tarbiyati Mansubah bara-e A'immah*, 4ff).
33. One hundred and seven participants hailed from Punjab, 59 from Sindh, 55 from NWFP, six from Baluchistan and 25 from Kashmir. Another 116 came from Islamabad, Bangladesh and from Skardu/Balistan. Of these, 84 participants were drawn from the Pakistan Army. In the twelfth course, another 27 military men were educated, seven others came from Baluchistan and five from Sindh (see *National programmes* (mimeo), Islamabad, 1989, 2 and Appendix V; own calculations thereof).
34. See *National programmes* (mimeo), Islamabad 1989, 2. In 1989 the Academy held its first course for the *Khutaba-e afwaj-e Pakistan*, with 33 participants (see *Da'wah Highlights*, Vol. 3, Jan. 1989, 13; also *Annual Report 1989/90 Session of the IJU* (mimeo), 30-41). There are plans to offer courses for senior army officers as well in the near future (see *Islamic Orientation Camp for Scout Leaders*, 2-7 May, 1992, Islamabad, 1992, 6).
35. Calculation from the lists of participants of different *Tarbiyat-e a'immah* courses (see *National programmes* (mimeo), Islamabad 1989). It is interesting to note that quite a number of participants were recruited from the NWFP, a region where the Deobandi school of thought is dominant.
36. *National programmes* (mimeo), Islamabad, 1989, 3.
37. At the beginning, about 4,000 people showed interest, but by the end of the first course, only 1,236 were left (see *Progress Report*, 19).
38. It is said that more than 50% of them were graduates and only 12% had passed the primary level. Most of them came from Punjab, followed by Sindh, NWFP and Baluchistan (see *Report, First Islamic Correspondence Course*, Islamabad, 1985, 3, 18ff; also *Annual Report 1989/90 Session, HU*, Islamabad (mimeo), 42).
39. See *Da'wah Highlights*, Vol. 3, Jan. 1989, 14; *Third International Da'wah Course for New Muslims*, Dec. 1991-March 1992, Islamabad, 1992, 34f. Recently, plans have been made to conduct

- correspondence courses at the international level (see *Islamic Orientation Camp for Scout Leaders*, 2–7 May, 1992, Islamabad, 1992, 5).
40. See *Islamic Orientation Camp for Scout Leaders*, 2–7 May, 1992, Islamabad, 1992, 8f.
41. By early 1989, thirteen students had already been sent to Cairo (see *National programmes* (mimeo), Islamabad, 1989, 2).
42. See *Second International Islamic Tarbiyah Program: Report*, Islamabad, 1984, 3; *Third International Da'wah Course for New Muslims*, Dec. 1991–March 1992, Islamabad, 1992, 31; for details of the courses see *7th International Islamic Leadership Training Camp. 1–31 Oct. 1990*, Islamabad, 1990.
43. See *Da'wah Highlights*, Vol. 5, April 1989, 1.
44. The exclusively traditional as well as modern sectors are hardly approached in the international context. They only become targets of the *da'wah* policy at the national level. Pakistani students of the University are considered to be the capital of the nation. Therefore, they are supposed to be able to study in tranquility, follow the ideals of the teachers and refrain from any political action, since they are not yet mature (*na pukhtagi*) for political action because they are still in an unsettled stage. Only after completion of their studies should they mix with leading personalities and help in defending the country. Hence, political neutrality is one of the main rules of the University. Being able to choose subject matter according to their natural faculties (*khudadad salahiyat*) instead of being guided by economic and career considerations should make their endeavours more successful. Their objective should be to work for the well-being of the state (*mulk*), as they have done in the past history of Pakistan. And, it is stressed, since Pakistan was established for the implementation of Islamic principles, students have to behave in a purely Islamic way. Furthermore, they should be well acquainted with speech since speech is the mirror of man. Finally, they should structure their life, engage in social services, be polite towards elders and respect teachers, etc. (see Muhammad 'Ashiq Bhatti: *Musalman Talib-e 'ilm: tulaba ke li'e*, Islamabad, 1989).
45. See *Second International Islamic Tarbiyah Program*, 50f. It may be noted that the internationalistic Islamic Organizations pretend to be brotherly but in fact are split into factions (see R. Schulze, *Islamischer Internationalismus*, Leiden, Brill, 1991).
46. E.g. 16% for workshops, 4% for games (later, time for leisure was enhanced considerably), 7% for discussions on *da'wah* techniques among different social groups, 12% for fieldwork, e.g. to Afghan refugee camps, 29% for situation-reports on different countries (especially on the situation of Muslims in Muslim minority areas. Some of these reports are published in *Da'wah Highlights*), 27% for lectures by eminent scholars.
47. See *First International Islamic Tarbiyah Program: Report*, Islamabad, 1984, 3f. Reference is often made to, e.g. Hasan al-Bannā. Also the Sanūsī movement, the Tablīghī Jama'at etc. are documented. Among others, the former Afghan *mujāhidīn* leader Gulbadin Hikmatyar gave speeches on *jihād* (see also *7th International Islamic Leadership Training Camp, 1–31 Oct. 1990*, Islamabad, 1990, 13–21).
48. *Usrahs* are also responsible for holding different daily programmes, and they may name different brothers (!) for help and support as well (see *First International Islamic Tarbiyah Program: Report*, Islamabad, 1984, 6).
49. See *The Islamic University Handbook 1985–86*, Islamabad, 1985, 9, 29f. *Manqūlāt* are supported at the cost of *mā'qūlāt*. It is not clear from the data available whether a division of labour exists in the Academy in regard to the subject matter, as is the case in the RAI, where the curriculum is developed by *salafi* scholars while its ideological critique is executed by neo-*salafi* intellectuals (as suggested by Schulze, *Internationalismus*, p. 327), implying that areas of intervention reflect the identities of the factions involved as well as the collective view of the Islamic microcosm.
50. See *First International Islamic Tarbiyah Program: Report*, 10; *7th International Islamic Leadership Training Camp, 1–31 Oct. 1990*, Islamabad, 1990, 21.
51. Currently, each representative of a country has to submit a report on the history of the Muslims in his country, their composition, their problems and some efforts for solving these shortcomings. Also, an Islamic infrastructure by correspondence is to be established (see *Fifth International Islamic Tarbiyah Camp: Report*, Islamabad, 1989, 4ff).
52. See *Third International Da'wah Course for New Muslims*, Dec. 1991–March 1992, Islamabad, 1992.
53. See *Da'wah Highlights*, Vol. 3, Jan. 1989, 14; *Islamic Orientation Camp for Scout Leaders*, 2–7 May, 1992, Islamabad, 1992, 5. The Muslim community in the Malay Archipelago—the largest in the world, Malaysia with approximately 14 million Muslims (see Denys Lombard, *Islam and politics in the countries of the Malay Archipelago in: Olivier Carre (Ed.), Islam and the State in the World Today*, New Delhi, Manohar, 1989, 233–247, here p. 234) and Islam as its officially recognized religion—was particularly interested in *da'wah*. In Kuala Lumpur as early as 1974 some social

- activities among Muslims and Muslim minorities were decided upon, among others, support for Islamic universities, youth groups and mission (see J. Reissner; Internationale Islamische Organisationen in: W. Ende & U. Steinbach (Eds), *Der Islam in the Gegenwart*, München, 1984, 545). Gradually, Malaysian ties with the Academy were therefore fostered.
54. The fact 'that he took a very firm stance in opposition to Ayatollah Khomeini, accusing him of flaunting the robes of a religious leader, without possessing the real qualities necessary to be one' (Denys Lombard, *Islam and Politics*, 236) might have fostered the Academy's and the movement's co-operation. For the *Dakwah* movement see, e.g. Schulze, *Internationalismus*, 262, 272, and Ozav Mehmet, *Islamic Identity and Development; studies of the Islamic periphery*, London and New York; Routledge, 1992, 48-50.
 55. The motto was to make Muslims better Muslims particularly since an integrative culture had prevailed as a result of the fact that a large number of customs had been maintained in many areas, especially in the field of civil law. The addressees were students 'usually itinerant, who went from one *pesantren* (religious school) to another to complete their religious studies ... usually coming from urban areas, particularly merchant families; they live on the communication net-work, keep up contacts with international Islam, and are naturally disposed towards a certain egalitarianism and even modernism ...' (Denys Lombard, *Islam and Politics*, 238f). Similar features can be observed for the participants of the International Tarbiyah Camp of the Da'wah Academy.
 56. See Olaf Schumann, Indonesien, Malaysia and die Philippinen in Ende Steinbach, *Der Islam in the Gegenwart*, 327.
 57. See *Da'wah Highlights*, No. 4, Feb. 1989, 11-13.
 58. See Muhammad 'Ashiq Bhatti, *Talib-e 'ilm*. It may be mentioned here that the concept of nationalism is considered to be a malady which only Islam is able to transcend (see *Da'wah Highlights*, Jan. 1991, 15-19).
 59. For the following see Raushan Ghani, *Iman-e billahi awr is ke 'amli tagade: 'am afrud ke li'e*, Islamabad n.d. Ghani makes extensive use of metaphors which may appeal to the emotions not only of 'ordinary man'. In the foreword the Chairman of the Academy explicitly attacks communism as being evil, while capitalism is not even mentioned.
 60. This booklet was written by an 'ālim, who himself is very active at the meetings and seminars of the Academy (see Amin Ahsan Islahi: *Agamat-e Din awr is ka tarigah-e kar (2): bara-e karkunan-e da'wat wa tabligh*, Islamabad, 1989). Again, this contribution, like several others, strangely starts out without a *basmalah*. In its foreword the Chairman of the Academy states that *da'wah* is important not only for this world but also for the Hereafter, suggesting a reward when engaged in mission. He also states that the Academy's activities are targeted against any kind of sectarianism.
 61. As the Director of the Academy put it in an interview in Islamabad in April 1992, the Academy is an independent body and does not reflect the interests of the Government.
 62. *Annual Report, 1989/90 Session, IIU*, Islamabad (mimeo), 63.
 63. Sayyid Quṭb in *Da'wah Highlights*, Vol. 5, April 1989, 3, 5.
 64. See *Da'wah Highlights*, Vol. 3, Jan. 1989, 1.
 65. The term Islamic or Pakistan ideology seems to pose a crucial problem even for the CII. In 1981, the council was asked by the Ministry of Education to define the ideology of Pakistan. This task had not been accomplished by 1982 (see Malik, *Islamisierung*, Chap. VIII).
 66. Ismail Faruqi in *Da'wah Highlights*, Vol. 3, Jan. 1989, 3-5. Although the officials of the Academy are critical about *taṣawwuf* and mystical orders, they have nevertheless opened the forum of discussion for Idries Shah in their *Da'wah Highlights* of Feb. 1991, 5-26.
 67. The so-called 'Da'wah Documentation Unit' was established only in 1987 but has already collected some 4,000 addresses of *da'wah* organizations and is planning to prepare a 'World Year Book of Da'wah' (see *Third International Da'wah Course for New Muslims, Dec. 1991-March 1992*, Islamabad, 1992, 35).
 68. See *Academy of Da'wah & Training: Establishment of a Media Centre*, 3.
 69. See *Progress Report*, 21.
 70. Personal information.